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Imaginary You is a multi-genre collection subdivided into three sections: “Impossible 
Motels,” “Imaginary Portraits,” and “Writing through Nightwood.” One of the 
manuscript’s main concerns is the exploration of an in-between space formed by the 
conflation of real and imagined experience. More specifically, the writing puts pressure 
on Wallace Stevens’ aphorisms, as stated in his Adagia, that “In poetry at least the 
imagination must not detach itself from reality,” and “The final belief is to believe in a 
fiction, which you know to be a fiction, there being nothing else. The exquisite truth is to 
know that it is a fiction and that you believe in it willingly.” Similarly, Imaginary You 
seeks to integrate a classical theory of lyric address into its fabric by abjuring the 
hermetic, solipsistic, and meditative voice fostered during the twentieth-century by poet-
critics (such as T.S. Eliot) and championed within contemporary lyric studies. To this 
extent, the book is, as R.W. Johnson writes in his monograph The Idea of Lyric, a 
collection of “I-You poem[s], in which the poet addresses or pretends to address his 
thoughts and feelings to another person”; likewise, the speaker of these poems re-creates 
“universal emotions in a specific context, a compressed, stylized story,” all the while 
“'sharing...these emotions” with an audience. Moreover, these lyric poems divide their 
“emphasis among speaker, discourse, and hearer,” so much so that the speaker becomes 
subservient to the other elements in that he forms his identity by carefully considering 
both discourse and hearer.
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Critical Introduction to Imaginary You
1. Contextualizing Pronouns through an Homage
To understand more fully the aesthetic, poetic, and conceptual goals of my 
dissertation Imaginary You, outlining the broader context from which the manuscript 
developed would be helpful. To this extent, I'll begin with a brief explanation of my first 
book, Homage to Homage to Homage to Creeley, whose composition immediately 
preceded my dissertation. More precisely, examining pronominal usage in my earlier 
collection (and my subsequent reaction to it) is of utmost importance.
The first-person pronoun appears exactly three times in Homage to Homage to  
Homage to Creeley, and each occurrence contextualizes this part of speech as an aesthetic 
or linguistic construct.  The first instance occurs in the poem “Blushing to a Concrete 
City,” where readers encounter the lines “earth's art / 'I' / face rusts” (Ware Homage 8); 
readers find the second instance in the lines “the fluorescent / gloss of art / 'I' / facial / 
lighting” (39) from the poem “You Sure Have Taken A Shine To That Cowpoke”; and 
“The Semantics of Progression” contains the final instance: “Un / raveled in id / 'I' / 
ohms” (44). In all three examples, the first-person singular pronoun a) is placed in 
quotation marks to indicate and call attention to the word as a contingent construct, and 
b) is embedded phonetically within another word so as to highlight both its complicity 
with and subservience to a greater semiotic system. Additionally, by embedding the first-
person pronoun within homophones of “artifice” and “idiom,” these lines conflate the 
concept of “I,” both physically (i.e. the face) and psychologically (i.e. the id), with the 
concepts of artifice and idiom.  In short, language play, in the form of punning, strips the 
first-person pronoun, and thus the author, of its “privileged moment of individualization 
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in the history of ideas, knowledge, philosophy, and the sciences,” and, instead, situates 
these moments of the “I,” and therefore the author, as relative components of a poetic 
discourse in an “unfolded exteriority” (Foucault 890) of aesthetics, language, and 
fragmented literary citation. The author and the “I” cease to be a determinate, ontological 
identity or “empirical character” and, rather, become a “function” that fills a “space left 
empty by the author's disappearance” (892). In some ways, the explanatory notes for the 
poem “A Kiss Less Consecrated” address this disappearance directly by denying a 
relationship between the speaker, “the poets,” and the author/“I”: “Why would you 
assume that 'the poets' are us? We have almost nothing in common” (Ware Homage 30).
But if the author, as Foucault claims, is now a function, what, in this situation, is 
that function and how does it fill the now empty space? In the case of Homage to  
Homage to Homage to Creeley, the author-function is a movement that does not so much 
fill, but navigates through this emptiness in an effort to challenge nominal designations of 
genre, discourse, and self: a protean nexus of relations “in a perpetual field of  
interaction” (Deleuze and Guattari 360); or, as stated in the explanatory notes for 
“Disintegration Loops V”: “It was the transference, from one form to another, that made / 
the ashen sunset memorable...Afterward / it was the absence of all the things they thought 
they had, but didn't” (Ware Homage 38): a continual transference of form producing an 
absence of presence.
Similarly, the second-person pronoun never appears in Homage to Homage to  
Homage to Creeley. In many regards, this second absence signals that the poems in this 
collection “have no audience,” and, thus, are “experimental” in the sense that the overall 
project “has no idea whether it will work or not” (Lyotard and Thébaud 13) because it 
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does not consider readership actively. Perhaps the book “will find [an audience and] will 
be liked,” but it is just as likely that it never will. One could, then, argue that Homage to  
Homage to Homage to Creeley dismisses audience entirely. To this extent, it is a book 
without an audience, just as it is a book without an author. Absent of author and audience, 
it is a book that does not exist.
While a non-existent text produces certain aesthetic and poetic effects worth 
exploring, as a writer and thinker, I desired to move beyond the ideas found in Homage 
to Homage to Homage to Creeley. This desire sprang from Gilles Deleuze's and Felix 
Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus, wherein the philosophers speak of a literature that 
“move[s] between things,” establishing “a logic of the AND” so that the “middle is by no 
means an average”; instead, the middle is a fluid continuum “where things pick up speed” 
(25). Their belief that movement between different or contradictory locations creates new 
and exciting possibilities directly informed what I wanted in my next collection: an I, a 
You, and a text founded upon the relationship between these pronouns. Such a text would 
be, theoretically, in direct opposition to Homage to Homage to Homage to Creeley, but 
the importance of creating it would be the poetic, aesthetic, intellectual, and emotive 
movement between itself and its predecessor. In fact, the explanatory notes to the poem 
“[un]identifiable origin, distinctive patterns” foreshadow this alteration when they state: 
“within a Deleuzian aesthetic, the multiplicity of conflicting processes, relations, and 
transformations which an aesthetic-object continually enters into takes precedence over 
1) particular, nominalistic designations and 2) aesthetic-objects that avoid, or attempt to 
avoid, passing through and between such mixtures” (Ware Homage 62). If we consider 
my oeuvre to be “an aesthetic-object” unto its own, then, adhering to “a Deleuzian 
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aesthetic” means that I must continually move “through and between...mixtures” that 
contain “conflicting process, relations, and transformations.” To do so, then, a radically 
different type of text would need to be produced so as to facilitate this movement and 
further promote the “logic of the AND”; this text, of course, is Imaginary You.
2. Toward a Classical Theory of Lyric Poetry
Given that Imaginary You focuses on the relationship between an I and a You, the 
manuscript falls squarely into the realm of lyric poetry. In his monograph The Idea of  
Lyric, W.R. Johnson's primary designation of the lyric is that it must be an “I-You poem, 
in which the poet addresses or pretends to address his thoughts and feelings to another 
person” (3); likewise, the “singer” of these poems re-creates “universal emotions in a 
specific context, a compressed, stylized story,” all the while, as mentioned, 
“'sharing...these emotions” with an audience (4). But twentieth-century lyric studies and 
modern poetry criticism consider the I-You dynamic problematic and dispute both its use 
and its function. In T.S. Eliot's still-influential essay “The Three Voices of Poetry,” the 
poet-critic champions a meditative poem wherein the “voice is the voice of the poet 
talking to himself—or to nobody” (96), thus eliminating the “You” all together. Of 
course, as Johnson notes, Eliot's meditative poem had its precursors:
after Jean-Jacques Rousseau's philosophical warrant to the supremacy of 
meditative verse, after the brilliant triumphs of Wordsworth and Coleridge, 
the young Goethe, Alphonse Lamartine, and Giacomo Leopardi, the 
meditative lyric, the “greater romantic lyric,” becomes the dominant form 
in modern lyric. The poet now talks to himself or to no one about his 
experience, which may or may not reflect emotion in a compressed story
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—and he finally tends to dispense with both story and emotion, even as he 
dispenses with the second-person pronouns, singular and plural. (7)
Regardless of whether Wordsworth and Coleridge had “brilliant triumphs” and their 
meditations became “the dominant form in modern lyric,” Johnson contends that lyric 
poetry in the form of meditative verse “grew first ashamed and bewildered, then terrified, 
by the idea of saying I, forgot how to say You, systematically unlearned emotions and 
their correlatives and their stories” (15). Far from producing positive outcomes, such a 
move toward isolation and an “absence of a real audience” thus engendered “an anxiety, a 
kind of bad conscience, a sense of the poet's irrelevance, impotence, and unreality” (16).
Imaginary You and its corresponding reintegration of the I-You dynamic into the 
lyric necessarily, then, situates itself as a traditional text in the classical sense. By this, I 
mean, if the meditative lyric initiated by the Romantics and codified by Eliot emphasizes 
a hermetic speaker at the expense of the second-person pronoun, narrative, and emotion, 
then the classical lyric attempts to divide “the emphasis among speaker, discourse, and 
hearer” (30). In fact, the speaker becomes subservient to the other elements in that he 
forms his identity by carefully considering both the discourse and the hearer, as well as 
his purpose for speaking. Quoting Johnson further and explaining the relationship 
between speaker, discourse, and hearer, we find:
By focusing on what he has to say, on why he is saying it, and on the for 
whom—not so much to whom—he is saying it, the speaker discovers the 
exact, the proper, form for his own character as speaker on this particular 
occasion, in this particular discourse; and, in fact, the purpose of discourse 
and the presence of hearer furnish the speaker with enormous power and 
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vitality. In this sense...he learns who and what he is by yielding himself 
wholly to the act of discourse. (31)
In the classical lyric, the speaker becomes a rhetorical entity predicated upon the 
discourse he enters into to, as well as who is listening to him. As far as Imaginary You 
concerns itself, the discourse is love poetry in the form of the lyric poem; but who is “the 
hearer”?
The hearer, in this case, can be understood as multiple entities, but I found my 
primary audience for Imaginary You in “real”-life. On 12 February 2011, the Colorado-
based poet Tina Brown Celona read at a Clean Part Reading Series event; thereafter, she 
and I began a poetic correspondence conducted primarily through email. Shortly after 
visiting with her during a mid-March trip to Denver, she sent me an email with the poem 
“First Intensity” attached to it, wherein she claimed she “had put [me] in [the] impossible 
position” of responding:
What you said about America
really happened
should you touch your body




I feel you like the ocean you feel me
like the moon
none of this is real (Celona, Re: RE: Did this go through)
The “impossible position,” to her mind, was my response to a love poem from a woman 
who I barely knew and, moreover, was already both dating and living with someone. The 
following day, I received a short email from her; she wrote: “And I was thinking, what if 
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we meet somewhere between here and Lincoln and (maybe) have sex? I might be able to 
get R--- to agree to it. I can ask anyway” (Celona, Re: Subject Heading Change par 4). 
She followed this proposition up the next day with a piece titled “Prose Poem”:
Somewhere between here and Lincoln, NE there will be a motel and 
people will be having sex in it.
-
Somewhere between here and Lincoln, NE, there is a motel and two 
people are having sex in it.
-
This is an imaginary motel in my daydream. (Celona, Re: Subject  
Heading Change)
Inspired by these emails and poems, I wrote the first eight “Impossible Motels” and sent 
them to her on 06 April. All of these motels, which are flash fiction pieces, focus on an I-
You relationship that unfolds within a motel room that, in most cases, is the scene of a 
fantastical or imaginative occurrence. For example, in “Impossible Motel: Room 12B” 
readers discover: “In the corner of a motel room, an apple flowers” and the bodies of both 
I and You “become trees.”
These imaginative transformations are of utmost importance to the first set of 
poems because they engage a concept Celona developed in her first collection of poems 
and, thus, speak to her about her own poetics; but the transformations challenge the 
identity of my primary audience as well. “Impossible Motel: Room 37A” states as much 
when we find that the “forearms” of  “You” can be transformed into “intensity”: “A motel 
room cannot transform your forearms because it is a motel room; a motel room can 
transform your forearms because it is the real motel room of poetry.” The distinction 
between “a motel room” and “the real motel room of poetry” is the distinction between a 
motel room one finds in the “real”-world, a motel room in the imagination, and a motel 
room in a poem (i.e. “the real motel room of poetry”). As previously mentioned, Celona 
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addresses this difference between an object in the real and that object as “the real [object] 
of poetry” in her the poem “A Song For the Moon,” which can be found in her first book 
The Real Moon of Poetry:
the moon is more beautiful
later
when i have gone to bed
with my poem
about the moon
with my beautiful poem
about the beautiful moon
in my poem
the real moon looks real
too real for my poem
the moon in my poem
is better
for poetry
the real moon of poetry
is better for me (34)
While, yes, “the real moon looks real,” reality does not constitute anything remarkable; 
realism, to this extent, is not desired. What, in fact, is sought is “the real moon of poetry” 
because it makes both the moon in the imagination and the moon in the real “more 
beautiful,” and thus “better for me.” In other words, the real moon of poetry benefits the 
poem in the imagination because it is aesthetically superior in its ornamentation; it 
benefits the moon in the real because, through the emotions produced by the poem, it 
intensifies our perceptions of and emotions attached to the moon in the real; and, finally, 
is better for an individual because is offers them a pleasure (or additional pleasure) that 
would otherwise not have been afforded them without the creation or reading of the 
poem. Moreover, and in reference to “Impossible Motel: Room 37A,” real objects of 
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poetry (e.g. the moon, a motel, etc.) effect transformations that otherwise could not occur, 
and these transformations in poetry necessarily have an ability to then effect 
transformations in the real. Given the heightened attention to the first- and second-person 
pronouns within these poems, this also begs the question: what kinds of transformations 
occur between the I of the real and the real I of poetry, as well as between the You of the 
real and the real You of poetry?
The notion of I and You as real entities was, initially, a problem I needed to work 
through. At first, because Celona was my direct audience, I thought of the You in these 
poem as the Celona of the real. She expressed suspicion over this idea and wrote via 
email:
When you said that the “you” in the poems was me, and I said, I'm sure 
she represents some aspects of me, and you insisted that she was me, I 
didn't know how to take it. Because how could she be me except by a kind 
of magic? Unless you knew me somehow, without my having to tell you. 
Maybe you meant that you wanted her/me to be real, or as real as possible, 
as opposed to more imagined or invented. But why? It's funny isn't it how 
we want the truth—the reality? How it matters? Because the more real it 
seems, the more the imagination can build on it. What is the relationship of 
the imagination to reality? (Celona, Re: here you go, par 2)
Indeed, what is the relationship of the imagination to reality and how were they affecting 
the poems we were writing to one another. I sent my first thoughts on the real versus 
imagined pronouns to Celona in an email soon thereafter. Of the You in the “Impossible 
Motels,” I wrote:
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That last point about “you,” as you write in your previous email, was 
troubling to you, somewhat, or at least you “didn't know how to take it” 
because how could the “you” be you “unless [I] knew [you] somehow, 
without [you] having to tell [me].” I should probably articulate better, to 
the extent that I might clarify...what I meant when I said that. First, and I 
think this bears mentioning, I don't believe any of us contain some 
authentic identity or core self that is who we are; in fact, its is my belief 
that we “contain multitudes,” as Whitman would say, and these multitudes 
within [us] constantly mutate, alter, move, and become 
different...depending on always fluid contexts...This, I think, is important 
to our conversation because you have told me something about yourself; in 
fact, you've told me many things about yourself. And, to some extent, I 
think the things you haven't mention, since you are...by nature, steeped in 
self-revelation, reveal even more about who you are as a person...or, better 
stated, such admissions and omissions reveal one of your persons or 
identities; or, even better stated, what you write/say and what you don't 
write/say creates a particular composite identity within the context of our 
letters, poems, and discussions. I believe, in a previous email, I referred to 
it as a “persona” I was becoming “enamored” with. Is the “you” of the 
Impossible Motels a definitive, all-consuming, or totalizing version of 
you? No. But the “you” of the Impossible Motels is no less real, or 
authentic, or whatever than any other “you” that you contain. I wonder 
how you feel about that? Certainly, the “you” I selected to work with 
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probably says a lot about a particular “I” building these motels, and I 
would not deny this in the slightest, but this in-and-of-itself does not 
negate the you-ness of “you.” “You” is you, even if you don't want “you” 
to be you; just as “I” is I even if I don't want “I” to be I...Another manner 
in which I conceptualized the “you” as you, and this is where I, perhaps, 
misspoke, is through a rhetorical lens, in that the “you” of the poem is for 
the you that is a specific audience. Whether or not you see yourself or 
identify with the “you” of the Motels, I'm building the Motels, at least 
immediately, for you. [W]ith an audience in mind, the “you” is you in that 
the “you” is for you[,] and I, as a writer, would like you to identify with 
the “you” on some level, just as I would like to identify with the “I” on 
some level. Does this explain, perhaps better, what I wanted to say or how 
I was envisioning the “you” and “I”? I hope so, maybe. (Ware, Re: here 
you go, par 2)
While the first half of the above email excerpt addresses the mutability of identity, even 
when a second-person pronoun addresses a primary audience (and, thus, develops tension 
within the universal-specific dyad), the latter half of this paragraph echoes Johnson's 
classic theory of the lyric, in that these pieces are for a specific audience and filtered 
through a “rhetorical lens.”  Additionally, since the I was “building the Motels” for 
Celona, and my primary goal was to intensify the feelings and emotions we were having, 
my own identity, the “I” I wanted to “identify with...on some level,” necessarily was 
bound to alter in an effort to create an “I” she would find appealing and work within the 
discourse of both love poetry and the lyric.
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3. The Exquisite Truth: Reality and Imagination
Later in the same email titled Re: here you go, I incorporated several quotes from 
Wallace Stevens's Adagia, two of which I use as epigraphs in Imaginary You. The first 
quotation was: “In poetry at least the imagination must not detach itself from reality” 
(Stevens qtd in Ware here you go, par 8); the second was: “The final belief is to believe in 
a fiction, which you know to be a fiction, there being nothing else. The exquisite truth is 
to know that it is a fiction and that you believe in it willingly” (Stevens qtd in Ware here  
you go, par 9). The first of these quotations interested me because, as I mentioned at the 
time, Stevens “recognizes, rather explicitly, the bond between the two realms,” in that 
“the relationship between reality and the imagination or poetry and the imagination” 
(Ware, Re: here you go par 13) is not a simple, either/or binary. In fact, Stevens's 
understanding of reality and the imagination within poetry can be conceptualized through 
the lens of Deleuze and Guattari's “logic of the AND,” in the sense that there cannot be 
one without the other if either is to functional well: they must both be present and 
continually modify one another if a poem is to be effective.
The opening motel provides an example of this symbiotic relationship when 
readers find the following sentences: “You remove your dress, the black fringed one you 
wear without irony to weddings, and a host of sparrows exits from the space between 
your breasts.” The “black fringed” dress of “You” was worn by Celona to a wedding 
“without irony” in the real, but certainly, “a host of sparrows exit[ing]” from anyone's 
chest is purely a product of the imagination. On the level of the image, then, the 
confluence of the real and the imaginary is evident. Of course, at the time I wrote 
“Impossible Motels,” we had not met in a motel, so the storyline was a fabrication of the 
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mind; but the emotional register, desires, and passions they conveyed were real. Thus, 
while I forward a fictional (i.e. an imaginary) plot, the impetus of the fiction stemmed 
from an identifiable, specific, and very real emotional context.
The latter of the two Stevens quotes in my email, though, further complicates the 
relationship between the real and the imagination. The complication arises because, in a 
certain sense, one must not be aware of what is real and what is imaginary. In the 
aforementioned email, I explained further:
The [exquisite truth] quote is my favorite, I suppose, because it raises to 
the level of philosophy and life-goal the concept of self-delusion. But, 
when self-delusion attains a certain primacy in one's life, it is no longer 
self-delusion or “fiction,” but a “truth” wherein “nothing else” exists. A 
dangerous thought to be sure, just look at how such “fictions” manifest 
themselves in the form of religion and nationalism, for example. Yet, 
within the realm of poetry and art, there seems to be a particular salvation, 
to Stevens'[s] mind, within that “fiction,” at least to the extent that he 
writes elsewhere: “The theory of poetry is the life of poetry. Christianity is 
an exhausted culture,” and “The theory of poetry is the theory of life.” 
(Ware, Re: here you go par 14)
To the extent that one initiates a “self-delusion,” wherein what is “fiction” and what is 
“truth” cannot be readily parsed from one another, the “logic of the AND” holds firm.
Moreover, the self-delusion necessary for fiction and truth to co-exist 
simultaneously speaks to Deleuze's concept of secrecy that he presents in his “Letter to a 
Harsh Critic,” which I quote in the poem “bringing you closer to what you speed from” in 
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Homage to Homage to Homage to Creeley; it states: “I believe in secrecy, that is, in the 
power of falsity, rather than in representing things in a way that manifests a lamentable 
faith in accuracy and truth” (Deleuze qtd in Ware Homage 28). If “truth” and “fiction,” 
according to Stevens, are indecipherable in that one must “willingly believe” in a fiction 
for it to become truth, there must be a disavowal, to some extent, of “faith in accuracy 
and truth,” or at least of a “truth” that is a knowledge-based and empirical; instead, 
Stevens promotes a “truth” predicated upon the imagination. Of course, as stated earlier, 
the imagination works best when tethered to the real: reality AND imagination in both 
cases.
Yet, it would appear, that when considering Deleuze and Guattari's “logic of the 
AND,” Deleuze's concept of secrecy, and Stevens's relationship between fiction-truth and 
reality-imagination, anxiety can form within the intended audience, the residue of which 
can be found in the previously quoted email (i.e. “That last point about 'you,' as you write 
in your previous email, was troubling to you, somewhat, or at least you 'didn't know how 
to take it' because how could the 'you' be you 'unless [I] knew [you] somehow, without 
my having to tell you.'”). The “troubling” effect Celona referenced manifests itself  in a 
poem she wrote for me during this time period; simply titled “Poem,” it reads:
You want the real me to be imaginary
and the imaginary me to be real
this frightens the real me
that the imaginary me is only as real to you
as the unicorn in the bathroom
and the swallows in our chests
and the apple tree in the corner
and the daggers of my forearms
15
and the glow of the fluorescent light
outside the door (Re: 1A)
Certainly, if someone looks for an “authentic identity or core self” within a lyric poem, 
one that seeks to achieve “more stability, vis-á-vis identity, and make efforts to solidify 
themselves in some way,” problems may arise, which in turn may “frighten” the audience 
or intended You. But if we are to believe in Stevens, Deleuze, and Guattari's concepts, 
neither the real nor the imagined can escape one another; there will always be elements of 
both in lyric: “the real me” (or you) will always contain part of “the imaginary me” (or 
you), just as “imaginary me” (or you) will always contained part of “the real me” (or 
you).
4. Pronouns Slide Frictionless: Specificity and Universality
In Imaginary You, I address the difficulty of assigning a definitive identity to, as 
well as escaping the identity of a particular pronoun in the third section of “Watchman 
What is the Night?” when I write: “pronouns slide frictionless among bodies” (Ware You 
92). This, obviously, acknowledges in a rather direct manner the protean nature of the 
pronoun, and the tropes of theater and the mockingbird found within “Writing through 
Nightwood” highlight this characteristic further. Take, for instance, the following: “We 
[are] born of bodies bound from birth to theater. In these words, a mockingbird.” While 
both the actor and mockingbird are “real” entities, both live through an imagined or 
copied identity such that they both exist by “slicing the imaginary into equal portions of 
the real.” Another example can be found in the sixth “Imaginary Portrait,” which reads:
You stand in a desert somewhere
west of Reno and rant about cowboys,
nationalism, and murder. But you also lie
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in a budget bed in North Platte, Nebraska
and watch yourself on a computer screen
as you stand in a desert of grayscales
somewhere west of Reno and rant
about cowboys, nationalism,
and murder. But you are also words
in this poem, which is to say
the joyous confusion of pronouns. (Ware You 56)
The “You” in the poem's first sentence refers to Roslyn Tabor's (who, in all actuality, is 
Marilyn Monroe) final “murderers” rant in the Arthur Miller film The Misfits; but the 
“You” in the second sentence refers to Celona watching The Misfits on a computer in a 
motel in North Platte, Nebraska. Of course, up until the ninth line of the poem, no 
acknowledgment of the alteration occurs. In fact, “you... / … / ...watch yourself on a 
computer screen” conflates the identities of Tabor, Monroe, and Celona purposefully. It is 
not until the final sentence where the complexity of the second-person pronoun reveals 
itself: “But you are also words / in this poem, which is to say / the joyous confusion of 
pronouns.” The “words” (i.e. “you”) of the poem (i.e. the lyric) are confusing; but this 
confusion, the poem posits, should not by a source of anxiety that troubles or induces 
fright. Instead, we, whether “I” or “You,” should immerse ourselves in a “joyous 
confusion” that affirms mutable identities and disavows “a lamentable faith in accuracy 
and truth.” What Imaginary You champions, then, is a poetry based upon events in one's 
life that shift through “some strange parallax altering space / between you and I” in the 
form of “words which are images / images which are imaginations / tethered to the real” 
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(Ware 71) as stated in the poem “Portrait.” In this sense, the question that the poem 
“Portrait” poses later is a red herring: “how many representations of / ourselves are 
necessary / to capture an authentic identity / when authenticity ceased to mean / anything 
ages ago, ceased / to exist ages ago” (72); it is a disingenuous question because, 
regardless of “how many representations of ourselves” we forward, there never will be 
“an authentic identity,” only “multitudes [that] constantly mutate, alter, move, and 
become different and differently, depending on always fluid contexts.”
In “Go Down, Matthew,” the penultimate section of “Writing through 
Nightwood,” the final conflation occurs. No longer, though, does the text focus on the 
real or imagined incarnation of You; rather, the texts entwines the I and the You, as well 
as the “I” and the “You,” into an impermeable chiasmus, thus rendering the relationship 
in the manuscript all the more complex. One can find the first instance in the first 
paragraph of the first sub-section:
I and “I” and you and “you” will never “we” 
outside  of  these  words,  which  makes  them 
sacred  because  they  are  impossible.  The 
impossible may appear to be theater, even to 
us,  but  this  is  only  one  perspective  of  the 
impossible.  Another  perspective  of  the 
impossible resides in the eternal. (Ware You 
96)
“These words,” which are part of the field of the lyric, become “eternal” in that they 
conjoin in an “impossible” manner the first- and second-person pronouns, as well as the 
real and the imagined versions of both. This, then, is the potential power of the lyric 
poem in Imaginary You: if done well, worlds and identities collapse into a continuum; or, 
as  my  Homage  to  Homage  to  Homage  to  Creeley foreshadowed  in  the  echoes  of 
Foucault, Deleuze, and Guattari, the lyric poem is “the process of becoming faceless,” 
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wherein  the  first-  and second-person are  neither  “the  subject  nor  the  object,  but  the 
movement that takes place between the subject and the object: a transitive state: a verb 
that  creates  ephemeral  and  conditional  [pro]nouns  as  effects  of  its  action  in  highly 
specific contexts” (Ware Homage 35). To reiterate, this is not to be a source of anxiety, 
but an affirmation of a Whitmanesque multitude, such that:
If you are a myth, then I am a myth; if you 
are  a  strange  source,  then  I  am  a  strange 
source; if you are an invention, then I am an 
invention.  We may never  know each  other, 
but we will both remember this: our song can 
be heard from everywhere because we sing 
our song for no one. (Ware You 98)
A song sung by a “singer” to a “hearer” through the lyric, where both the “signer” and 
the “hearer” are “never know[n to] each other”; but due to this transient capacity, “our 
song can be heard from everywhere.” In essence, R.W. Johnson posits a similar condition 
in the lyric when he writes: “The private and the public, the merely personal and truly 
universal resist one another, yes; but from that struggle comes lyric poetry, both monodic 
and choral, at its best” (73). And this, then, is what makes  Imaginary You more than a 
series of missives from one lover to another: while initially composed to a specific You, 
pronouns shift so that determinate identities move toward protean and more generalized 
pronouns; this shifting expands the audience and allows readers to enter the text and 
empathize with these pronominal-identities (i.e. the universal and the specific held in 
tension). Far from miring in the solipsistic quagmire of Eliot's “first voice,” these poems 
encourage an audience to “identify either with the ego (“I”) or with the tu (“you”) of the 
song, or [they] can identify with both almost simultaneously” and become “part of the 
lyrical discourse” while “witnessing this compressed, dramatic instant, listening to the 
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words and the rhythms that illuminate it,” moving them to ponder their  relation to it 
(Johnson 72).
Given  the  multiple  identifications  the  poems  produce,  it  should  come  as  no 
surprise,  then,  that in the fifteenth “Imaginary Portrait”  we discover the lines:  “Your 
voices /  shift red to you, you to red shift /  back again, coloring pronouns,” which is an 
overt allusion to Ted Berrigan's poem “Red Shift” and its lines “I'm only pronouns, & I 
am all  of  them,  & I  didn't  ask for  this  /  You did” (516).  Both “Alone & crowded” 
(Berrigan 516), the speaker of Berrigan's poem, as well as the I and You of  Imaginary  
You, allow “The world's furious song [to] flow...through [our] costume.”
5. Escaping the Mouth: Instrumentality of the Lyric
More  than  affirming  protean  pronouns  and  the  “logic  of  the  AND,”  though, 
Berrigan's poem frames the lyric as a powerful and efficacious device when he writes: “I 
came into your life to change it & it did so & now nothing will ever change / That, and  
that's that” (516). The lyric's ability to “change” someone's “life” re-conceives the genre 
as a pragmatic tool, capable of “real”-world effects that literary critics have taken great 
pains to disavow. In Rei Terada's “After the Critique of Lyric,” she claims that the “lyric 
zone of electrification is dissipating along with belief in the autonomy of the lyric object 
and in the specialness of the lyric mode. I'm relieved to see this and would like to see still  
more  of  it”  (196).  In  the  introduction  of  his  book  Ends  of  the  Lyric  Direction  and  
Consequences of Lyric Poetry, Timothy Bahti doesn't even bother defending the alleged 
“worthlessness”  of  the  lyric  within  the  world;  instead,  he  dismisses  such  pragmatic 
possibilities outright, stating: “I have scarcely anything to say in this study about such 
'ends'—application and fates” because he believes “poems end in their reading” (2). But 
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it  is  not  just  scholars  who  exult  in  an  impotent  lyric  mode;  certain  poets  have 
championed it as well, most notably W.H. Auden's claim that:
For poetry makes nothing happen: it survives
In the valley of its making where executives
Would never want to tamper, flows south
From ranches of isolation and the busy griefs,
Raw towns that we believe and die in; it survives,
A way of happening, a mouth. (940)
Just as Bahti believes that a poem ends with its “reading,” Auden forwarded an argument 
that a poem “survives / In the valley of its making,” which is to say the “mouth” of the 
poet, and away from “executives,” “ranches,” and “towns” (i.e. the practical places we 
live, work, “believe and die in”).
One would not, necessarily,  be incorrect in classifying  Homage to Homage to  
Homage to Creeley,  the book with no author or audience, as this very kind of impotent 
text that Auden laments and in which Terada and Bahti rejoice. But bearing this in mind, 
I set out produce a pragmatic and affective text, which happened to be Imaginary You.  
With the composition of my dissertation, I wanted to render tangible effects within the 
world: for poetry to make something happen; for poetry not just to survive but to create 
and destroy. In many ways, this desire for a book that would affect the world and people 
living  in  it  resonates  with  Deleuze  and  Guattari's  sentiments  at  the  beginning  of  A 
Thousand Plateaus:
There is  no difference between what  a  book talks about and how it  is 
made...As an assemblage, a book has only itself, in connection with other 
assemblages and in relation to other bodies without organs. We will never 
ask what  a  book means,  as signified or signifier;  we will  not  look for 
anything  to  understand  in  it.  We  will  ask  what  it  functions  with,  in 
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connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities, 
in which other multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed, and 
with what bodies without organs it makes its own converge...A book itself 
is  a  little  machine;  what  relation...of  this  literary  machine  to  a  war 
machine,  love  machine,  revolutionary  machine,  etc...which  other 
machine[s can] the literary machine...be plugged into,  must be plugged 
into in order to work. (4)
If Imaginary You is a book of love poems in the lyric mode, then it was constructed in, 
while simultaneously fostering, an assemblage of love between I and You: two bodies 
without organs filled with sensations that sought to flow into one another. It functioned, 
then, as a connection between actual bodies, transmitting intensities from one to the other 
so as to convergence and metamorphose them: the literary machine and the love machine 
plugged into one another so as to do work.  This assemblage of literary machine and love 
machine worked, in the sense that it  brought bodies together from across a distance, 
meeting in  motels,  fucking,  loving,  creating relationships,  and altering the aesthetics, 
poetics, and day-to-day lives of two poets and others.
But not all of the effects produced by the composition of Imaginary You could be 
consider pleasurable; it gave rise to the emotional and psychological torment of several 
people. In the sense that the book's composition produced a struggle between competing 
individuals for the affections of a lover, the literary machine plugged in the war machine,  
constructing an assemblage that worked as a weapon against an adversary. To the extent 
that this assemblage moved outside of the poetic, aesthetic, and literary worlds and into 
the “Raw towns” so as to foster “busy griefs” within individuals; to linger no longer in 
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“the valley of its making,” but, instead, to enter into realm of the “executives” whose 
concerns,  as  the  “Bow  Down”  section  of  “Writing  through  Nightwood”  states,  are 
“politics, $, and data”;  Imaginary You existed as an overt response to a world that has 
relegated poetry to the margins. No longer content to stand aside passively, these poems, 
through a confluence of the real and the imagined, employed the mindset of “executives” 
by casting off non-instrumentality and, thus, “seizing the tools to mark the world that 
marked them as other” (Haraway qtd in Ware Homage 33). In other words, these poems 
return to  a world they both escaped from and were shunned by in  order  to  produce 
pragmatic affects.
One could rightly ask whether or not such an approach to poetry is ethical.  I 
would answer that it is doubtful; but a poet is not an ethicist. This is not to say that a poet  
cannot act ethically, but any ethical word-action is merely happenstance, just as any non-
ethical word-action is happenstance. A poet lives beyond ethics, or so says the final verse 





you are also a destroyer. (Ware You 98)
A poet,  in  this  case  “You,”  is  both  “maker”  and  “destroyer,”  but  this  making  and 
destroying, as previously stated, is beyond ethics; hence, the poet is “not just,” for the 
concept  of  justice means little  within the poem. What  matters  are  the aesthetics  and 
poetics of a poem and whether or not it is able to produce a tangible action outside the 
“valley of its  making,” regardless of what that action is or how people or groups of 
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people judge that action. In other words, for it to be a success, one must ask of the poem: 
does it work, in that it works upon bodies in the world?
Given that I saturated Imaginary You with references and allusions to a plethora 
of twentieth-century films1, I thought it apropos to close with a scene from a film that 
addresses the ethical concerns (or, more precisely, the lack thereof) of a poem and a poet.  
To this extent, one cannot help but be reminded of Alexander and Ismael's meeting in 
Ingmar Bergman's  Fanny & Alexander, in  which Ismael  shows Alexander  how one's 
imagination can escape the mind and enter the world of the living so as to kill his step-
father  (i.e.  Bishop Vergérus).  Ironically,  it  is  the bishop who tells  Alexander that  the 
“Imagination is something splendid,  a mighty force...held in trust for us by the great 
artists,  writers,  and  musicians”  (Bergman  Fanny  &  Alexander).  But  “trust,”  in  this 
instance,  should  not  connote  a  relationship  to  integrity,  expectation,  or  hope;  rather, 
“trust” simply means the imagination is entrusted, or put in the charge of, artists, writers, 
and musicians. It is artists, writers, and musicians’ duty to create art, nothing more and 
nothing less.  Vergérus, a religious man, lives his life by a moral code based upon a 
Christian  mythology;  Ismael  and  Alexander  live  their  lives  in  an  in-between  world, 
fusing  the  real  and the  imagined into  artistic  creations.  Let  the  critic  (the  priests  of  
literature) connect morality to art in the form of criticism; let the artist create.
But the relevance of the Ismael and Alexander scene in Fanny & Alexander is not 
meant only as an example of the manner in which artists function beyond ethics; it is 
brings to the forefront the fluidity of identity, similar to the use of pronouns in Imaginary 
You (and thus brings this introduction full-circle as well). When Ismael asks Alexander to 
1 Movies referenced or alluded to in Imaginary You are: Jezebel, Gone With the Wind, Maltese Falcon,  
The Misfits, Les Amants, La Strada, Killing of a Chinese Bookie, The Graduate, and Breakfast at  
Tiffany's,
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sign a piece of paper, the latter is surprised to find that, instead of writing “Alexander  
Ekdahl,” he has written “Ismael Retzinky.” About this strange transference, Ismael says: 
“Perhaps we're  the same person,  with no boundaries.  Perhaps we flow through each 
other, stream through each other boundlessly and magnificently.” It is no coincidence, 
though, that the site of this boundless and magnificent flow occurs on a piece of paper, in 
words written by artists attempting to name names, but, instead, resulting in a “joyous 
confusion” of  protean selves,  which  itself  leads  artists  to  a  powerful  moment of  the 
imagination affecting the real. 
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